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Abstract 
This article describes how the legal conditions for collecting and processing data collected with event data 
recorders in vehicles (EDR) must be taken into consideration in a context of operationally-oriented road 
safety research. Because these data can allow to identify drivers of vehicles, directly or indirectly,the 
technical and organizational conditions must comply with European and country legislation on the protection 
of personal data and privacy. Potential drivers must volunteer to have the recorder on board and for data 
collection. Consent must be freely given, be informed and specific. The EDR must not affect vehicle safety. 
Specific conditions apply when vehicles are service vehicles potentially driven by different agents on 
duty.All these legal requirements have been applied for an experiment conducted in France. They can be 
transferred to other European countries because they are based on EU rules and principles derived from the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Road event data recorders (EDRs) are increasingly used to conduct studies and research in the field of road 
safety and traffic or to allow services to be delivered to users, such as real-time services for traffic 
information or deferred services such as adjustment to insurance premiums. In the field of research, they are 
the main tool for performing studies like "Naturalistic Driving" type [1, 2, 3]. But because such a system can 
record data that can be used to identify drivers and learn their travelling and driving habits, it is important to 
be familiar with the technical and legal requirements for installing them in vehicles and implementing 
collection in full compliance with the laws. The issue of the confidentiality of personal data is one of the 
main concerns to be considered when the data is collected with EDRs [4]. 
EDRs may be instrumented on private vehicles but also in national or local private company or public fleets, 
i.e., in cases where vehicles are not necessarily assigned to a single person and can be driven by different 
people in a professional context.  More specific terms of protection must then be respected due to the 
hierarchical relationship between the drivers and the vehicle owner (usually the employer). 
In 2010, the French Government (DSCR
1
) decided to support a new research programme based on the 
analysis of traffic incident data.  This project called S_VRAI (Saving Lives by Road Incident Analysis 
Feedback) brings together IFSTTAR and Cerema (two public research institutions) with road infrastructure 
managers. One of the project's objectives was to implement EDR in public vehicle fleets to analyse incidents 
in three geographical areas for a collection period of one year (August 2012 to July 2013) [5]. 
The first step was to ensure that the experiment was legal, especially the respect of drivers' right to protection 
of their personal data and privacy. Although these conditions were applied for a French project, they are 
transferable to most European (and possibly international) projects because they are based on the 
requirements of respect for human rights and on EU rules. 
This action was in itself one of the goals of the research. The article will therefore be mainly focused on the 
issue of the protection of the personal data and privacy of drivers of vehicles equipped for experimentation 
and the technical and organizational procedures enabling these rights to be guaranteed (section 3). Before 
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this, we will describe the project in general terms and some of the legal requirements related to other 
considerations (section 2). 
 
2. The S_VRAI project 
 
This project was based on an EDR called EMMA (Embedded data logger for accident mechanisms). It was 
designed by IFSTTAR's MA laboratory with the help of Kerlink
2
, a small company specializing in "Machine 
to Machine" [6].  
The main ideas followed in order to design this EDR were: 
- facilitating the work of staff in charge of vehicle fleets to implement them in vehicles and for data 
collection, with automatic transfer via a secure GSM connection; 
- complying with the regulations and recommendations of the CNIL 3 by limiting periods of data 
acquisition to situations of interest from the standpoint of research. Only incidents and collection in 
specific areas defined by the team as areas of interest in terms of road risk were considered [6]. 
Within the meaning of the S_VRAI project an incident can be defined as an event occurring during an action 
that may disrupt a normal driving situation. 
From a conceptual point of view, the incident will correspond to a break in the user's normal driving situation 
that marks a shift to a degraded situation (incident). Without an appropriate emergency manoeuvre this 
situation could result in a collision or a loss of control which could have material or personal injury 
consequences (accident). 
From an operational point of view, an incident is a driving situation where a user is close to an accident 
situation. For example, when the driver performs an avoidance manoeuvre or brakes heavily, or when, in 
order to stay in lane in a bend, undergoes lateral acceleration close to the safety threshold.  
To characterize the driving situation, the EMMA continuously acquires: 
- analogue data from sensors directly integrated into the EDR (accelerometers and gyros), 
- data from a GPS (trajectory and speed), 
- available data passing through the BusCan, the availability of which depends on the vehicle model. 
The data are first analysed using real-time processing performed by the on-board software to detect potential 
interest situations (events). Processing is based on the following principles: when acceleration and jerk 
signals exceed a threshold at the same time, an event is triggered [4, 5]. Data are acquired 30 seconds before 
and 15 seconds after triggering at a frequency of 100 Hz and stored in the system that automatically 
generates an electronic report of the event (GPS positions, values of dynamic parameters and a simplified 
speed profile). This report is then automatically sent to IFSTTAR servers for examination. If the event is 
considered to be of interest, all the data, at a frequency of 100 Hz is downloaded for detailed analysis. 
Fifty EMMAs were installed on board the fleets of four public agencies (2 road managers and 2 research 
institutions). 
These fleets were located in northern France (Normandy-Centre region) in the centre (Auvergne region) and 
in the south (around Salon de Provence). More than 200 people likely to drive these vehicles agreed to 
participate in the experiment. Among these, over 150 also agreed to provide personal information: gender, 
year of birth and the date they obtained their driving license. This information was associated with an 
individual code obtained using hashing algorithms and stored in a personal magnetic card. These cards were 
sent to volunteers who could decide at the beginning of each journey whether or not to send their code to the 
EDR using an RFID reader installed in the vehicle. For other drivers or if the card was not red only data on 
driving and vehicle dynamics was collected. In addition, to respect the fact that participation was voluntary, 
for the reasons explained below, the drivers always had the option of disabling or not enabling the 
acquisition system. 
In terms of safety and security, the technical conditions to implement EDRs in vehicles are as follows: 
- The EDR must meet EU standards in terms of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and radio and 
telecommunications terminal equipment (R & TTE). 
- The procedure for installing EDRs does not change vehicle compliance with respect to safety and 
respect for homologation and approval procedures. 
                                                 
2
 http://www.kerlink.fr 
3
 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés - National Commission for Computing and Liberties, the 
French administrative authority responsible for supervising the protection of individuals' personal data. 
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Verifying these conditions allows compliance with regulations on vehicles and provides a guarantee against 
liability waivers by the insurer in the event of an accident. 
These requirements were met in the S_VRAI project by conducting tests to ensure that the EMMA boxes 
were compliant with the regulatory requirements in force for EMC and RTTE. This made it possible to 
obtain from the Ministry of Transport a one-off exemption for vehicles equipped with EMMA, and put into 
service without any further formality. 
Over and above "EDR technique" compliance, one of the main challenges of the project involved 
implementing measures to protect the personal data that these EDRs can collect. 
 
3. EDRs and the protection of drivers' personal data 
 
The collection and processing of personal data raises ethical issues which the law may be the bearer of to 
protect the rights of those concerned. It is therefore necessary to determine the data that can be directly or 
indirectly identifying in the specified context. This then makes it possible to take the best protection 
measures in the event of it not being possible to perform irreversible anonymization, at least during the 
period of collection and analysis. During this period, some of these data are necessary for the management of 
the fleets of vehicles and boxes, as well as for the study itself. It is also necessary to determine the legal basis 
for collecting and processing data. Finally, in the light of the principles laid down by national or European 
rules, measures should then ensure the confidentiality and security of these data. These technical or 
organizational measures are the backbone of the implementation conditions for processing the data collected 
by an EDR. 
 
3.1 The personal nature of data collected by the EDR 
 
The regulatory requirements applicable in France are borne not only by domestic law (law 78-17 modified 
on 6 January 1978, compliance with which is controlled by the CNIL), but also by European laws. The 
United States are starting to develop legislation in the same direction. 
The European Union (28 Member States) included the protection of personal data in EU law in 1995 
(Directive 95/46/EC of October 24, 1995). Since 2012, a reform of the directive has been undertaken which 
has been replaced recently by a regulation directly applicable in domestic law
4
. This protection is equivalent 
to a fundamental right since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 which recognizes the rights, 
freedoms and principles of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 (European Union treaty, 
Art.6.1; Charter, art 7, privacy; Art.8, personal data). For its part, the Europe of Human Rights (47 Member 
States) long ago sanctioned this protection (European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Art. 8, privacy) 
and Convention of January 28, 1981 called the "convention n° 108" (personal data). 
In the US, most recent motor vehicles are equipped with EDR. The Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 
specifies the rules concerning them (§563.6 et seq.). Some States have developed protection of drivers' 
rights. 17 states adopted rules for EDRs and the protection of privacy. Some have made provision for the fact 
that collections can only be made with the consent of the vehicle owner or driver, subject to exceptions. In 
2015, federal law placed limits on data recovery via EDRs and issued a reminder that these data belong to 
the owner or hirer of the vehicle
5
. 
In this way, the desire to protect personal data is not a special feature of France and is compulsory in many 
countries
6
. The events of recent months have shown the ability of European authorities to shake things up in 
order to take better account of the rights of people concerned by the processing of personal data, such as 
invalidating the Safe Harbor principle [8]. Future EU rules act in the same direction and will be applicable in 
the field of on-board recorders in vehicles as they will more broadly to connected vehicles. 
Personal data 
Personal data are characterized by the fact that they enable the identification and profiling of a person. In this 
case, the use of an EDR can be used to characterize his/her driving behaviour and travel habits. It is essential 
                                                 
4
 Regulation adopted the 14
th
 of April 2016 by the to be effective in 2018. Legislative resolution of the European 
Parliament (05419/1/2016 - C8 - 0140/2016 - 2012/0011 (COD)). 
5
 http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-of-data-from-event-data-
recorders.aspx. 
6
 The mandatory nature is characterized by the ability of the legal and supervisory authorities to impose penalties. 
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to remember that the notion of personal data is not limited to privacy. The data are personal  if other data that 
might enable the person to be identified are also collected. 
Under French law, personal data consists of "any information relating to an identified person or one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, by reference to one or more features that are specific to him/her. To 
determine whether a person is identifiable, all the means enabling him/her to be identified which the person 
in charge of processing or any other person has or may have access to should be considered"(law 78-17, 
Art. 2). The 1995 directive refers to "an identification number" and to "specific features" proper to the 
"physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity" of the person. The future European 
regulation also refers to "location data", an addition that has an impact in the field of mobility and road risk. 
The source of the collection and identification matters little: the person concerned, an on-board data recorder, 
a navigation system, a smartphone connected to the dashboard, the combination of multiple data, etc. In the 
field of on-board recorders in vehicles, many data allow identification of the driver: the vehicle identification 
number, the serial number of the EDR, the IP number of an on-board computer, the MAC address of a 
smartphone, etc. [9, 10]. This identification then makes it possible to characterize his driving activity (for 
example when did he start braking before a collision or actuated any other control?) or even to try to define a 
driver behaviour profile (aggressive, etc.) by analysing his accelerations. 
Among the data that are useful in the field of road safety research, the most critical are geolocation and data 
which can characterize an offence, such as speed at a given time in combination with geolocation. 
Contextualization by means of video is also very valuable, but poses some problems with regard to 
recognizing people. 
Geolocation 
Geolocation opens up vast perspectives in the field of road safety and mobility analysis. But it is also used to 
qualify the place of the object in space at any time regardless of the location technologies used (GPS, WiFi, 
Bluetooth) and on-board communication devices (sensors installed in a vehicle, navigation systems, 
smartphones , etc.). In doing so, it informs on where the carrier of the object is located, makes it possible to 
trace his/her movements and habits (living places, places he/she goes to, etc.). According to the G29
7
, smart 
mobile devices are "inextricably linked to individuals”. “It is usually possible to identify them directly or 
indirectly" [11]. In other words, geolocation is an indirect identifier. Researchers have shown that 4 location 
points were sufficient to allow 95% reidentification of 1.5 million mobile phone users even though none of 
the data collected was an identifier on its own [12]. Origin-destination points are also sensitive because they 
identify dwelling places, particularly in relatively isolated areas or in the case of collection with a certain 
amount of frequency. Cross-referencing them with information from other databases, such as 
sociodemographic or vehicle registration databases, reinforces their ability to draw the profiles of people 
identifiable through their travel or driving behaviour. 
Location data are protected under the 2002 "privacy and electronic communications" directive which recalls 
the requirements for protection of personal data laid down by the 1995 directive and the fundamental rights 
recognized by the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 2002 directive defines location data as "any data 
processed in an electronic communications network or by an electronic communications service, indicating 
the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly accessible electronic 
communication" (Art. 2c)
8
. 
Limits on the use of location data have been laid down by the authorities protecting personal data, for 
example when examining the e-Call system (on-board emergency warning system), especially with regard to 
insurers and motor vehicle manufacturers. As these devices should not allow constant tracking of vehicles, 
permanent connection is ruled out [9, 13, 14]. The CNIL has validated the e-Call because the alert is 
triggered only after the collision and its sole purpose is to alert the emergency services (CNIL, deliberation 
2010-096). The future European regulation is intended to apply the principles of protection to any 
information concerning an identified or identifiable person, the location data being in this text considered as 
an identifier (recital 24, Art. 4). Though any data associated to geolocation will be consider as personal data. 
                                                 
7
 Group for the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data established under Article 29 of 
the 1995 directive. Its mission is to provide advice and recommendations on data protection. It is composed of the 
presidents of supervisory authorities of the countries of the European Union (CNIL in France) and representatives of 
European institutions such as the European Data Protection Supervisor. 
8
 European Parliament and the Council, “The processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications),” Directive 2002/58/EC, 12 July, 2002. 
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In the S_VRAI project two geolocation categories were considered: 
 
1) The first concerns the need to have information about the 30 seconds prior to triggering the system and the 
15 seconds following it. This information is essential for understanding the incident or accident since it is 
agreed to decompose the course of the accident sequentially as follows [15]: 
- The driving situation, which corresponds to the "normal" situation for the driver during which he is 
in control of his vehicle. 
- The disruption point, which corresponds to an interruption of the driving situation which thereby 
puts the system in danger. 
- The emergency situation, which covers the space-time between the break point and the collision. 
- The collision situation that encompasses the nature of the collision and its consequences 
As these geo-tagged data are limited to 45 seconds around the incident but have to be fine for a thorough 
analysis, the GPS position were recorded at a frequency of 1 Hz. 
 
2) The second relates to the needs expressed in order to know the road sections on which the vehicle fleets 
are driving. They concern the GPS traces of all routes of each vehicle. In accident research, one of the most 
frequently used indicators is the accident rate. It is calculated for a road section by dividing the number of 
accidents on this section by the number of kilometres travelled on the same section (the notion of risk 
exposure). The accident rate is used for the operational needs of network operators such as determining 
which road sections are at higher risk, evaluating the effectiveness of development work by comparing the 
accident rates before and after development work, general comparison of groups of road sections, etc. 
As GPS traces are only required to characterize traffic on a section on which there is traffic, they do not need 
to be associated with vehicle drivers, and so their records were "isolated" from driver data. Moreover, as 
these data may be potentially identifiable, their acquisition frequencies were reduced to 1 pt/min. 
In addition, when geolocation is associated with the current speed, knowledge of the speed limit on the 
section makes it possible to presume that an offence has been committed by the driver. This circumstance is 
particularly monitored by the CNIL in France. 
Offence data 
In France, only certain authorities are empowered to be aware of offence data (1978 law, Art. 9). In 2010, the 
CNIL issued a reminder of its extreme vigilance regarding the collection of offence data, specifically 
targeting instantaneous speed (deliberation 2010-096, April 8, 2010, which essentially concerned insurers 
and motor vehicle manufacturers). Considering vehicles with driver assistance systems (e.g. for navigation), 
it is possible to collect data about the driving speed and about location data. Using them in association is 
likely to characterize a violation of the regulations on speed limits. 
But instantaneous speed and geolocation data are essential for the analysis of road risk. The fact of having 
continuously available speed measurement with geolocation makes it possible to finely link driving speed 
and the characteristics of the road infrastructure, thereby allowing further analysis, such as: 
- detailed knowledge of the kinematics of driving on improvements designed for road safety. 
- knowledge of speeds on secondary networks that are not well known and for which there is a road 
safety issue from the standpoint of risk. 
- knowledge of speeds on urban networks especially those where the deployment of roadside 
measurement devices is not possible. 
- analysis of speeds in connection with the road characteristics (geometry, equipment, service level). 
This is essential for capitalizing knowledge and drafting recommendation guides for planners and 
managers. 
- analysis of driving speeds (and acceleration) for applications relating to the environment. 
 
In France, the CNIL may grant an authorization for the collection and processing of such data (1978 law, 
Art. 25-I-3) to public bodies when the need for the collection is legitimized by the intended purpose and the 
mission assigned to these agencies (public service missions) and when all measures are taken to ensure data 
confidentiality and security. This was the case for the S_VRAI research project, since the need for having the 
current speed and geolocation data available was justified as being relevant for their work, and because the 
research organizations involved in the project are public institutions. 
According to the draft European regulation in its current form, the processing of data relating to offences 
must be authorized by law or placed under control of "public authority" (Art. 9bis). 
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Context videos 
It must be possible to consolidate the quality of the results of a road safety study by viewing the context 
because it helps answer questions like: what is the event that triggered the system? what was the 
characteristic of the infrastructure at the time of the incident? in order to perform a diagnosis that will 
provide a list of relevant actions to be implemented. 
The team obtained CNIL permission to film the context as an experiment. To this end additional conditions 
must be introduced into the protocol: it is essential to blur faces or license plates of vehicles at the source so 
as not to identify people travelling on public roads. The length of the recording must be linked to the 
duration of the incident or passing through the area of interest. The continuous acquisition of images on 
public roads additionally requires authorization from the Interior Ministry. 
 
3.2 The legal bases for implementing a recorder project   
 
While researchers, particularly those from the public sector can access these data for their research mission, 
this does not exclude the obligation to take appropriate confidentiality and security measures in order to 
respect the rights of drivers, even though they volunteer to participate in the experiment. Their confidence is 
based on trustworthiness, legality and transparency of the process, and the legal requirements for collection 
and processing (1978 law, Art. 6.1 °), confirmed under the future Regulation (Art. 5.1.a) that the research 
team is firmly committed to respecting. 
Legitimate, specified and explicit purposes 
Firstly, only data needed to achieve the intended purpose must be collected. These are the principles of 
necessity and proportionality: data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive (1978 law, Art. 6.3). It is 
indeed the purpose that determines the choice of data. In the field of scientific research, this corresponds 
exactly to the rigour required to define the problem, the assumptions and the appropriate methodologies. 
The purposes have to be legitimate, specified and explicit. 
Legitimacy of purpose based on an identifiable legal basis (1978 law, Art.7; Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 7). In 
the case of research based on data collected by an EDR, consent will be the legal basis used. The public 
status and the public service mission with which the partners involved are invested, especially the processing 
data controller, consolidate the legitimacy of collection and processing. In the case of research, it is true that 
it is possible not to obtain consent, for example when obtaining it would require disproportionate efforts. But 
this was not the case here, since the drivers were specifically asked to take part in the experiment. 
The explicit nature of the purposes is here to be found in the statement of the research problem and the topics 
defined: in our case identifying areas for progress in understanding and preventing road risk. 
They are explicit because they have been clearly and precisely defined and outlined in the research project 
and in the briefing notes prepared for people likely to be driving the equipped vehicles. 
Free, informed and specific consent 
The voluntary nature of drivers' participation is a non-negotiable imperative if collection and processing are 
not backed by one of the other bases provided for by legal provisions (1978 law, Art. 7;. directive 95/46, Art. 
7; future European Regulations, Art. 6). 
Consent must therefore be granted "knowingly." It is characterized by "any manifestation of specific and 
informed free will, by which the person concerned accepts that the data concerning him/her is to be 
processed" (directive 95/46 / EC, Art.2.h). 
Three factors characterize it. It must be free, informed and specific. According to the future European 
regulation, it must also be unambiguous (Art. 4.8) and the processing data controller must be able to 
demonstrate that consent has really been given (Art. 7). These requirements meet the principle of 
transparency embodied by an obligation to inform about the purpose of the collection and processing 
methods (what is it exactly that drivers agree to when clicking an "I accept" icon?). 
Free consent: consent is deemed valid if it is independent of any constraint. It must be obtained without 
pressure and without incentives, particularly where the collection takes place in a professional environment 
and when a hierarchical relationship may affect consent. Independence is manifested primarily by the option 
of not consenting [16]. 
This implies two consequences which were respected for the S_VRAI project:   
- default disabling of vehicles that could be driven by different drivers to ensure that non-volunteer 
drivers ran no risk of having their data recorded; 
11
th
 ITS European Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, June 6-9, 2016 
 7 
- reversibility of consent for volunteer drivers without having to justify why, including those driving 
fleet vehicles (service vehicles) when collection and processing are not necessary for carrying out 
the professional activity. Withdrawal of participation mighty concerns a particular route (the system 
is temporary disabled) or be definitive. 
Enlightened or informed and specific consent: These conditions require fulfilment of a duty of information 
on the part of the processing data controller on the use of data (objectives, methods), their future, their 
recipients: who has access to what and to do what with? The information must be complete, accurate and 
accessible. 
All potential drivers of the equipped vehicle were informed (by written information and/or an oral 
presentation of the project) about the experiment. Furthermore, since the vehicles equipped were service 
vehicles being driven for professional reasons, the opinion of staff representatives was collected following an 
information meeting. Considering that consent must be truly enlightened, drivers were also informed that the 
recorded data might be required by the judicial authorities, notably if accidents occur. 
All the information measures taken made it possible to obtain consent given "knowingly" collected on forms 
that gave a reminder of the general principles of the project and the commitments of all parties.  Collection 
of written consent makes it possible to attest to its truth and to oblige the person to read the main methods of 
implementing the experiment. 
Prospects for extending aims favourable to research 
Consent relates to the purpose and the recipients of the data, which in principle means no re-using of data 
without previously granted consent from the person concerned by the data, unless authorized or if there is a 
legal or regulatory obligation. 
It may be admitted that it is impossible to obtain consent if there is no other way to achieve the purpose. In 
this case, a fair balance between the legitimate interests of the processing data controller and the fundamental 
rights of the person concerned must be struck (see 1978 law, Art. 7 5° and [16]). This possibility is enhanced 
in the future European regulation for purposes not inconsistent with the initial purposes. Though, the 
objectives related to research or production of statistics will be presumed to be compatible with the initial 
purposes, although any identifiable person still has the right to object to the collection. 
Specifically, in these circumstances, the right of opposition by the persons concerned will sometimes be 
difficult to implement. For this reason, in order to allow personal data to be reused in trustworthy conditions, 
and while it is physically impossible to get back to the person concerned to seek his/her consent, some ideas 
are suggested. For example setting up a creative Commons type license for the reuse of personal data, 
inspired by licenses developed in the field of intellectual property rights (Privacy Commons movement). 
Privacy and security measures will obviously have to be taken. 
 
3.3 Privacy and security 
 
As we have seen above, the fact that the person concerned by the data may possibly be identified requires 
supporting measures to be implemented to collect and process this data. In the context of an experiment such 
as that conducted for the S_VRAI project, irreversible anonymization, for at least the period of the study, is 
not desirable, as we shall see. 
Physical persons consent certainly allows data to be collected and processed. But one should firstly be 
transparent with regard to the drivers, as has been described above, and, secondly, take organizational and 
technical measures to ensure privacy and data security. Among the tools available are pseudonymisation of 
identifying data and the partitioning of data access. Finally, the security measures taken should prevent 
illegitimate intrusions. 
Pseudonymising when anonymizing is not possible 
In 2009, the European data protection data controller issued a reminder that "for personal data to be 
processed anonymously, no-one, at any stage whatsoever of the processing - taking into account all means 
reasonably likely to be used either by the processing data controller or by another person - must be able to 
link the data considered to an identified person" (notice of July 22, 2009 on the ITS draft directive of 2010). 
The European working group on data protection (G29) stressed in turn that the use of anonymous data should 
be preferred whenever possible [4, 17]. Deletion of nominative data does not guarantee that there will be no 
identification and that the link between the data and the person concerned will be broken. 
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In addition, to carry out this type of experiment researchers have to know some identifying data, or even 
personal data: 
– Material implementation of the experiment requires knowledge of the vehicles in which the EDRs 
are installed (to manage the fleet of recorders, fit them and maintain them). When a vehicle is used by only a 
limited number of drivers (or even just one), the data reported by a vehicle can easily be associated with a 
driver. Procedures should therefore be set up to limit the risk of indirect identification. 
– Road safety research sometimes makes it necessary to collect data, some of which are potentially 
identifiable, if only indirectly or by cross-referencing them. For example geolocation for traceability or 
profile data such as gender, age, driving experience, etc. Such data were collected in S_VRAI using a 
magnetic card as explained above. 
To enable these magnetic cards to be managed, correspondence tables were kept for the duration of the 
collection and managed by team members who did not have access to the data collected. 
For the analyses themselves, potentially identifying data were pseudonymised by encryption. All data were 
encoded and compressed. Data that could be used to identify the driver directly, such as name and date of 
birth, or indirectly, such as the vehicle identification number or EDR serial number, were encrypted using a 
hash algorithm. 
Pseudonymisation guarantees a certain level of confidentiality with respect to third parties and staff. But it 
does not guarantee that the person will remain anonymous or even that it will be impossible to reidentify 
him/her. Informed consent then becomes important. That is why each volunteer was informed about the 
project together with his/her right to access their own data and their right to erasure. 
Compartmentalizing data access and confidentiality 
In organizations likely to host data, one aspect of security is the possibly contractual requirement of 
confidentiality, (written undertakings, rules etc.). In the S_VRAI project, two types of partition were set up: 
one with regard to the line managers of volunteers, who had no right of access to data, the other with regard 
to the project partners. Each partner had limited access to the data needed to conduct the study he was in 
charge of. 
Line managers, just like the people who performed the studies, signed non-disclosure agreements 
individually. 
This separation was designed to limit access to the data solely to the research teams who needed them to 
carry out the studies. This partitioning was all the more essential because the fleets taking part were under 
the responsibility of services whose staffs were also taking part in the studies. 
Securing the data access chain against unlawful intrusions 
Security is justified by two objectives that can be achieved by implementing technical measures. 
The first is the right not to be recognized when this is not necessary, by people who have no right to learn 
personal data. All measures must be taken by the processing data controller to preserve data security (1978 
law, Art.34). 
The second concerns the prevention of intrusion by unauthorized persons, particularly for malicious purposes 
which could have consequences not only in terms of capturing driver data but also in terms of accident risk. 
The security of servers, networks and terminals (sensors, EDRs, research staff's computers) should be as 
reliable as possible to prevent these intrusions. Technology can be used to create the conditions for this 
security. 
These aspects were taken into consideration at all levels of the collection and processing chain in the 
S_VRAI project. The measures deployed were evaluated by a state agency which issued a statement 
concerning data security. This statement warrants that the data is protected all the time that it is being 
transferred and processed, from storage in the EDRs to hosting in IFSTTAR and Cerema servers, via transfer 
through the telecommunications system. 
The "right to be forgotten" 
The "right to be forgotten" is not expressly covered by French or EU law. In the digital world, this is 
sometimes illusory [18]. It has not been sanctioned in the latest version of the future European regulation but 
the "right to erasure" was enhanced (Art. 17). Some of the measures included in the 1978 law (Art. 6.5 °) and 
in directive 95/46/EC (Art. 12b) show that the legislator is already sensitive to this aspect. It is not possible 
to store data in a form allowing identification of people beyond the time necessary to achieve the objectives. 
For example, when examining the e-call system, the CNIL imposed data erasure as soon as they had been 
used for purposes of assistance and relief (2010-096 deliberation of April 8 2010, above). 
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In the S_VRAI project, erasure of identifying data and correspondence tables was imposed as of the end of 
the research. Nominative data were deleted as soon as possible. In some cases, they could be stored in 
completely separate files from the processing files, for example for archiving or storage in case any legal 
dispute should arise. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Applying all of these conditions meant that the project could be completed in a context of confidence with 
respect to the different people involved: 
– the drivers, who agreed to entrust us with their data. Having obtained authorization from the CNIL 
confirming that all the security and privacy measures had been taken was sometimes a decisive factor for 
people agreeing to participate in the experiment; 
– the road managers who showed their interest; 
– the CNIL, which issued an authorization in respect of: 
 the legality of the goals and the legitimacy of those invested with a public service mission to help 
prevent road risks; 
 the implementation of measures to guarantee the right of volunteer drivers, clearly informed 
beforehand about the initiative. 
The measures adopted may be regarded as an example because they are related to an experiment that 
produced significant results in terms of knowledge of road risks related to infrastructure as part of the 
S_VRAI project.  This project also showed that it was possible to conduct this type of study in compliance 
with the rights of the people concerned, by taking these rights into account as of the design stage. In addition 
to research projects, the framework defined by the researchers can also be tested in the context of the 
deployment of connected vehicles. The framework deployed in the S_VRAI project meets with the concepts 
of Privacy by design and by default that will be imposed by the European Regulation from 2018; the security 
measures meet with current requirements that will be consolidated by the cybersecurity directive proposed in 
February 2013 by the European Commission, approved in December 2015 by the Council, which should 
come into force in 2018 as Regulations on the protection of personal data 
The legal and technical framework proposed by the research team could therefore be used as a basis for 
conducting a similar experiment in Europe. Because it creates a precedent, this approach can also be 
considered a favourable method for building confidence in volunteers involved in this type of experiment; 
this trust is becoming increasingly essential in view of changing technologies on board vehicles. 
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